

2016 POLICY PROPOSAL

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In the South China Sea, China is ostentatiously overriding the international law by rapidly erecting artificial islands and military facilities in an attempt to expand its territorial rights.

Heedless to the protests by the United States and neighboring basin countries, China has constructed runways on three of the seven artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, radar facilities on four of them and deployed surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and military aircrafts on the Woody Island. What it amounts to is that China is fast turning the islands in the South China Sea into military bases and it is a matter of time for China to perfect allocation of fighters and complete a full network of exclusive air defense identification zone thereby creating a sanctuary of the entire region.

China's strategy in the South China Sea is bifocal: one, to amass sufficient military capabilities to block the US intervention in the event of its armed annexation of Taiwan and, two, to possess ample nuclear retaliatory capabilities indispensable for China to be a super enough power to vie with the United States. It is crystal clear, therefore, that China intends to install in the South China Sea submarine-launched ballistic missiles capable of attacking the US mainland.

To that end, China is eyeing first on deploying submarine-launched ballistic

missiles (SLBM) capable of assaulting the US mainland and militarizing those artificial islands and inlets to turn the entire sea area a sanctuary, thereby to eliminate approaching enemies and to acquire nuclear retaliatory capabilities.

If China should succeed in its South China Sea strategy, the existing order of security in the Asia-Pacific region would be totally jeopardized.

Meanwhile, in the face of the aggravating situation in the South China Sea, the Obama administration only keeps on repeating words of warning against China and its behaviors and hardly catch up with China's swift moves, having failed thus far in having China revert its conducts much less blocking them.

It is imperative that the utmost efforts be made to check China's strategy in the South China Sea; a comprehensive strategy must be laid out covering not only security but more broadly politico-economic aspects as well.

It is essential that in so doing we must bear in mind the position of Taiwan most perfectly situated to hold the pass of China's ocean bound advance.

Taiwan not only checks China's naval advance into the Pacific Ocean, blocks China's drive to make a sanctuary of the South China Sea and plays a vital, irreplaceable role in maintaining the trustworthiness of the US nuclear umbrella. We should never overlook Taiwan's strategic role in formulating anti-Chinese strategy for the Japan-US Alliance.

The Friends of Lee Ten-Hui Association in Japan has hitherto made proposals: we proposed on January 18, after the turn of year 2016, "Smooth Transfer of Political Power in Post-Election Taiwan" and in 28th January "Early Realization of Taiwan's Participation in TTP". The present proposal is a follow-up on security compiling the discussion at the Study Group on Japan-US-Taiwan Security, adopted at the February 14 session of the study group and approved both by the board meeting and the general assembly.

This proposal will be submitted Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, speaker and president of both houses, ministers of foreign affairs, defense and other ministers. The proposal will be uploaded in the association's homepage, etc.

2016 POLICY PROPOSAL

Immediately Start Joint Patrol of South China Sea against China's Hegemonic Expansion

In the South China Sea run sea-lanes that link the Indian Ocean and East Asia in the shortest distance, where 40 thousand tons of vessels sail the year around. This is an extremely vital sea area for the world economy to survive on and for the US Navy to ensure freedom of swift maneuver and action in, swinging between the two war zones, the West Pacific and Indian Oceans,.

In recent years China purports “historical grounds” in defiance of international law to proclaim jurisdiction over the entire region of the South China Sea, attempting to forcefully expand its sphere of influence against its military power. China’s move to control the free movement of foreign war vessels and aircrafts within the area under its alleged jurisdiction is the major cause of the undue tension in the South China Sea.

The South China Sea is crucial for China eyeing on building a powerful maritime nation towards restoring the glory of the Han race. While the sea is vital for China for the economic purpose of amassing natural resources as well as achieving its goal of winning an hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region worthy of a superpower vying shoulder to shoulder with the United States, China deems it indispensable to ensure a route for its naval advance into the open sea and to possess a nuclear retaliatory power - the strategic necessity of which is far more grave.

China’s construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands was first confirmed early in 2014, and two years afterwards, 1 January this year, an operational test was performed for aircrafts to take off and land on the runway in the Fiery Cross Reef. China is thus going all out rapidly to build a military base in the South China Sea, having completed reclaiming seven artificial islands in Spratly and is expediting the construction of base facilities. If left unattended, the situation will no doubt aggravate to the extent that China’s military base will have completed in no time, fully equipped with operational and maintenance facilities

for aircraft and military architectures. That done, China will develop combat aircrafts, set an exclusive air defense identification zone and eventually succeed soon enough in turning the South China Sea an inland sea of its own. We should never let this happen.

Should the SSBNs deployed in the South China Sea acquire a long enough range to attack the US mainland, the US would lose its anti-Chinese nuclear retaliatory power - so would the trustworthiness of the US' nuclear umbrella.

The US' nuclear umbrella ensures its allies' security, and once it is jeopardized the very basis of their security policy will crumble and the US-led security system will concurrently fall into pieces. It is a nightmare of the very basis of the US-led security system disintegrating before the very eyes of those US allies dependent on its nuclear umbrella.

In September last year, in the top-level talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, President Obama expressed grave concern over China's unilateral attempt to change the status quo as signified in its construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, but Xi Jinping indicated no sign of concession whatsoever and reiterated his conventional position that the South China Sea has always been a territory of China and that it is within China's sovereign authority to construct military facilities in the region.

China not budging an inch on the South China Sea issue and resolutely refusing free access of the US navy to the region, President Obama, now convinced no diplomatic measure would lead to a solution and sent at long last in October last year a naval vessel within the 12-nautical mile limit of the Subi Reef to force a free-access operation.

Tackling the problem of the South Sea China problem is not an either-or matter between negotiation or restraint. Nonetheless, action without power delivers neither effect nor solution.

If diplomatic means fails to make China withdraw its forcible expansion policy through, nothing less than a more unsparing counter action would work.

The freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is the consistent wish of the international community, and time is pressing for an exacting action to be taken to nail it down, not by way of negotiation but of restraint.

A collective action is thus imminent not to depend only on the United States but to construct a consortium of voluntary basin nations in executing a collective operation for ensuring freedom of navigation to deter China's design to militarize the area. Letting the government and people of China be aware that the international community consistently supports freedom of navigation should best deter China's behaviors.

The US has been taking the freedom-of-navigation operation singularly since last October once in three months, and China has each time reacted with rebuffs denouncing the US action, insisting that its presence in the South China as provocative and unjustifiable, and threatening to resort to armed retaliation.

Should China and the US engage in armed conflicts on the tension-filled sea region, chances are hardly nil for a contingency to ensue. A joint patrol by voluntary basin nations will have dual effects of sending the international community's message straight to China and thereby of preventing China's provocative behaviors.

The Japan-US alliance, the core of the security system in Asia, must take the initiative in formulating a union of voluntary basin nations over the South China Sea.

The most feasible option will be, first and foremost, for Japan to take the lead by sending air fleet and naval force to join the US in the joint patrol, beef up defense outlays and broaden the Japan –US Alliance to tri-party frameworks of Japan-US-Australia and Japan-US-India.

Taiwan is situated in a position infinitely crucial for the Japan-US Alliance 's anti-China strategy and its cooperation is indispensable. It is thus a matter of utmost urgency that a security cooperation system be formulated by Japan, US and Taiwan.

Japan should on its part expedite enactment of a Japan-Taiwan Basic Relations Act to clarify Taiwan's legal identity for the purpose of cementing its security cooperation system.

Taiwan recently built a PC-3 system of antisubmarine warfare aircrafts common to Japan and the US and drastically stepped up information exchange,

extensive surveillance, and anti-ship offensive capabilities.

Taiwan is now expected to carry on operations based on its own defense initiative, sustain close contact in information exchange and operational coordination, further build up national defenses, and promptly garner ability to engage in modern warfare.